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WYETH v. LEVINE: AN UNEXPECTED OUTCOME FOR
"THE BUSINESS CASE OF THE CENTURY."
by
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM*

There was much anticipation in the business world as the
U.S. Supreme Court prepared to announce its decision in the
case of Wyeth v. Levine.' During the previous year, the court
had ruled that, in most instances, state product liability claims
could not be filed against manufacturers of medical devices
that had been approved by the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA). 2 The hope was that the pro-business justices would
extend this immunity to pharmaceutical companies who
marketed FDA approved drugs. The Chamber of Commerce,
which underwrote a multimillion dollar lobbying campaign to
push for federal preemption as a protection against state court
actions, referred to Wyeth as the "business case of the
century." 3 Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan, of Stamford
University, noted that "corporate America has discovered that
they would much rather be regulated by one government in
Washington than by 50 state governments, or by the most
4
aggressive ofthem." It was, therefore, quite a disappointment
to Wall Street when the court ruled that federal law did not
preempt state law actions against manufacturers of FDA
approved drugs.

*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Iona College, New
Rochelle, NY
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I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

The Food and Drugs Act of 19065 was the first important
federal legislation in the area of public health regulation to
supplement the protection provided through state regulation
and common-law liability by prohibiting the manufacture or
interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs and by
providing for the creation of the FDA to regulate the food and
drug industries. Thirty-two years later, Congress passed the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 6 in response to
growing concerns about the continued distribution of unsafe
drugs and the use of fraudulent marketing. Under the FDCA,
a manufacturer could not engage in the interstate marketing of
a new drug until the FDA had determined that it was "safe for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof'. 7 The FDCA's
premarket approval process required the manufacturer to
submit a "New Drug Application" (NDA) to the FDA for each
If the FDA rejected a
new drug it sought to market.
manufacturer's application because the drug was deemed to be
unsafe for use as labeled, the manufacturer was prohibited from
selling that product. If, on the other hand, the FDA approved
the application or failed to act within 60 days after the
application was filed, the new drug was eligible for sale. 8
The FDCA were altered with the passage of the Drug
9
Amendments of 1962 (the 1962 amendments).
One
particularly significant change resulted in the shifting of the
burden of proof so that the FDA no longer had to show that a
drug would cause harm. The manufacturer now had the burden
of establishing that its drug was both "safe and effective" and
that its labeling was not "false and misleading." That meant
that the sponsor had to demonstrate that the drug was "safe for
the use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
10
suggested in the proposed labeling" and that there was
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"substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
11
labeling."
While the Drug Amendments of 1962 increased the powers
of the FDA, they also contained a savings clause that
specifically addressed the issue of the federal preemption of
state law claims. That provision stated that:
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall
be construed as invalidating any provision of
State law which would be valid in the absence
of such amendments unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments and
such provisions of State law. 12
Prior to 197 6, 13 the states had the primary responsibility for
regulating new medical devices. The passage of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) not only authorized the
FDA to regulate medical devices, as well as drugs, it also
contained a federal preemption provision that expressly
prohibited states and their political subdivisions from
establishing, or continuing to give effect to, requirements
relating to medical devices intended for human use that were
either different from the requirements established under the
MDA or which related to the safety or effectiveness of the
device. 14
While Congress had never enacted a preemption provision
(similar to the one contained in the MDA) for prescription
drugs, the FDA attempted to rectify that omission when it
inserted a substantive preemption statement into the preamble
of a seemingly benign regulation concerning "Requirements on
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Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, Supplementary Information (the 2006
Regulation)." 15
The wording of the preamble, which
preempted state tort claims involving FDA approved drugs,
reflected an on-going policy of the Bush administration to
insert preemption language into regulations relating to a variety
of federally regulated products- including cars, mattresses,
motorcycle brakes, and railroad cars. 16
The preamble
specifically stated that:
[The] FDA believes that State laws conflict with
and stand as an obstacle to achievement of the
full objectives and purposes of Federal law
when a statement that FDA has considered and
found scientifically unsubstantiated . . . [or
when State law] purports to preclude a firm
from including in labeling or advertising a
statement that is included in prescription drug
17
labeling.
Congress overhauled the FDCA and attempted to strengthen
the resources available to the FDA when it enacted the FDCA
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAAA). 18 Under the new amendments, the FDA was
authorized, under certain circumstances, to compel label
changes in the event that negotiations with the manufacturers
have been unsuccessful, 19 to require manufacturers to
undertake additional safety studies even after a drug has
20
received FDA approval, and to require a manufacturer to
change its drug label based on safety information that becomes
21
The
available after the FDA has initially granted approval.
FDAAA did not, however, include or endorse the preemption
language contained in the preamble of the 2006 regulation.
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II.

THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
A. The Drug Application Process

The FDA's review of a New Drug Application (NDA)
focuses on whether the drug is safe and effective for its
intended use. Among the items included in the NDA are "the
labeling proposed to be used for such drug"22 (with "adequate
directions for use" as well as "adequate warnings" against
unsafe use and methods of administration), 23 "full reports of
investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug [was] safe for use and whether such drug [was] ...
24
effective in use, and "a discussion of why the benefits exceed
the risks [of the drug] under the conditions stated in the
labeling." 25
The wording of the label is of particular concern to the FDA
since is a primary source of information for clinicians in
making prescription decisions. A label typically includes a
description of the drug's intended uses as well as its potential
risks, contraindications, warnings, precautions and adverse
26
In the course of reviewing a NDA, the FDA and
reactions.
the manufacturer discuss, in detail, the wording of any
proposed warnings. If the FDA approves an NDA, the
manufacturer must market the drug with the specific final
version of the drug's label. 27
As a general rule, a manufacturer may not alter an FDA
approved warning label unless the FDA approves the
manufacturer's Supplemental NDA. 28 That having been said,
the FDA's "Changes Being Effected" regulation (CBE
9
regulation/ does allow a manufacturer to make some changes
to a label after a supplemental application has been filed but
prior to its approval by the FDA. The CBE regulation applies
in those instances in which the manufacturer seeks to "add or
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strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse
reaction" or to "add or strengthen an instruction about dosage
and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of
30
the drug product. "
B. The FDA Approval Process for Phenergan
Promthazine hydrochloride is an antihistamine, which was
developed by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, to treat nausea. The
FDA originally approved Wyeth's NDA for the drug in 1955.
Since then, Wyeth has sold the injectable drug under the brand
Phenergan can be injected either
name of Phenergan.
intramuscularly or intravenously. An intravenous injection can
be done by an "IV-push" method or an "IV-drip" method. The
" IV -push" method allows the clinician to inject the drug
directly into the patient's vein. The "IV-drip" method, on the
other hand, requires the clinician to place the drug into a stream
of saline solution flowing from a hanging intravenous bag.
The solution then slowly drips through a catheter that has been
inserted into the patient's arm.
After receiving its initial approval to market the drug,
Wyeth continued to communicate with the FDA concerning
issues relating to the text of the warning label for Phenegran.
In 1973, 1975, and 1981, the company submitted three
supplemental NDAs for the drug. The first two were approved
after the FDA proposed a number of labeling changes. A third
was submitted in 1981 in response to a new FDA drug labeling
rule. Between 1981 and 2004, Wyeth and the FDA continued
to communicate intermittently concerning the wording of the
warning label. In 1987, the FDA suggested that the label be
changed to address the risk of arterial exposure. Although the
federal agency received a revised label 3 1 from Wyeth in 1988,
it never responded to Wyeth's submission- and Wyeth
continued to use the previously approved label. In fact, Wyeth
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35

did not hear from the FDA again about the warning label until
1996- when the FDA asked to see a copy of the then in-use
label for Phenergan. After Wyeth complied with that request,
it was instructed by the FDA "to [r]etain verbiage in current
label" 32 as it related to intra-arterial injection and to make a
few other
related to intra-arterial injections. In
1998, the FDA finally approved Wyeth's 1981 application with
the provision that the final printed label "must be identical" to
3
the approved package insert?

surrounding tissue where it came into contact with arterial
blood.) In the following weeks, Levine developed
the tissue in her right forearm died, she experienced extreme
pain, and her fingers slowly started to tum black. The doctors
tried to stop the spread of the gangrene by amputating her right
hand. When that did not work, they eventually had to amputate
her entire forearm .

III. LEVINE V WYETH-A STATE COURT ACTION

Levine originally sued the health center and the physician's
assistant for her pain and suffering, substantial medical
expenses, and the loss of her livelihood as a professional
musician. Both lawsuits were settled out of court. Levine then
filed a complaint against Wyeth Pharmaceutical, the
manufacturer of Phenergan, in the Vermont Superior Court,
based on state common-law actions of negligence and failure36
The complaint alleged that the
to-warn product liability.
label on the Phenergan product was defective, not because it
failed to warn of the danger of gangrene and amputation
following an inadvertent intra-arterial injection, but, because it
failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method of
intravenous infusion rather than the more dangerous IV-push
37
method.
According to Levine, "Phenergan is not reasonably
safe for intravenous administration because the foreseeable
risks of gangrene and loss of limb are great in relation to the
drug's therapeutic benefits. " 38

A. Background
Diana Levine, a professional musician who had played the
electric bass guitar for bands such as the Re-Bops and Duke
and the Detours, suffered from debilitating migraine
headaches. On April 7, 2000, Levine . went to the Northeast
Washington County Community Health, Inc., a local health
clinic in Vermont, and asked to be treated for a migraine and
nausea.
She was given Demerol for the pain and an
intramuscular injection of Phenergan for the nausea. Later in
the day, she returned to the clinic complaining of "intractable"
migraines, "terrible pain," inability to "bear light or sound,"
sleeplessness, hours-long spasms of "retching" and "vomiting,"
and the failure of "every possible" alternative treatment. 34
Jessica Fisch, the physician's assistant, responded by
administering a second dose of
time through a
direct intravenous injection into Levine ' s arm by means of an
"IV push" procedure. Phenergan, a corrosive drug that is
meant for infusion into a person's vein, can cause irreversible
gangrene if it inserted into a patient's artery. Unfortunately
the Phenergan given to Levine entered her artery (either
because Fisch inserted the needle directly into the artery or
because the drug was injected into a vein and then escaped into

B. Vermont Superior Court

Wyeth filed a motion for summary judgment based on the
argument that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims were
preempted by federal law. The trial court rejected both the
defendant's field preemption and conflict preemption
arguments and concluded that the record up until that point
"lack[ed] any evidence that the FDA set a ceiling on this
matter."39 When the case proceeded to trial, the plaintiff
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presented expert evidence in support of her assertion that the
risk of either intra-arterial injection or perivascular
extravasation is almost completely eliminated when the drug is
40
She also
administered by IV -drip rather than IV -push.
submitted into evidence the correspondence between Wyeth
and the FDA regarding possible changes to Phenergan's label.
The five day trial ended with the judge giving two key
instructions to the jury. The first was that although the jury
could consider the evidence that Wyeth had compiled with the
FDA requirements, it did not have to conclude that compliance
necessarily meant that the warnings had been adequate. The
second crucial instruction was that FDA regulations "permit a
drug manufacturer to change a product label to add or
strengthen a warning about its product without prior FDA
approval so long as it later submits the revised warning for
41
review and approval." The jury, in response to the questions
on a special verdict form, found that Wyeth was liable for
negligence, that Phenergan was a defective product since its
warnings and instructions were inadequate, and that there was
no intervening cause to disrupt the causal connection between
the defendant's negligent actions and the plaintiffs injuries.
The jury awarded the plaintiff a final damage award of
$7,400,000 (which was reduced by the amount of the previous
settlements with the physician's assistant and the health
center).
The defendant then filed a motion for judgment as a matter
of law- which was based on preemption arguments. On
August 3, 2004, the trial judge rejected the motion on three
grounds. The first was that there was no direct conflict
between FDA regulations and Levine's state-law claims. Not
only did the FDA regulations permit strengthened warnings
without its approval on an interim basis but Wyeth had been
aware of at least 20 reported cases of gangrene amputations
similar to Levine's since the 1960's. The second ground was
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that Levine's state tort liability claim did not obstruct the
FDA's work. In fact, the federal agency had not spent much
time addressing the question of whether to warn against the I-V
push administration of Phenergan.
Finally, the court
emphasized the compensatory function of the state law action
that was absent from the federal regulation. 42
C. Supreme Court of Vermont

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Vermont, Wyeth
claimed that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to
consider the plaintiffs claims (since they conflicted with the
defendant's obligations under federal law and were therefore
preempted) and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the
issue of damages.
In a 4-1 decision, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court decision in its entirety--rejecting the
defendant's preemption arguments on the grounds that Wyeth
could have changed the warning concerning the IV-push
administration of Phenergan without prior FDA approval and
that the "federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a
ceiling, for state regulation."43
In order to determine if the doctrine of preemption applied
in this case, the majority relied on the following analytical
model:
Congress' intent may be explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure or purpose. In the absence of an
express congressional command, state law is
preempted if that law actually conflicts with
federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it. 44
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It also noted that the presumption against preemption (absent a
clear congressional intention to supersede state law, including
45
state common law duties) has "added force" when there is a
"long history of tort litigation" in the area of state common law
at issue.46 Since Wyeth had conceded that Congress had not
expressly preempted state tort actions through the FDCA and
did not intend the FDCA to occupy the entire field of
prescription drug regulation, the court only considered whether
it was "impossible for the private party [Wyeth] to comply with
both state and federal requirements" and whether Vermont's
common-law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
47
execution of the full purposed and objectives of Congress."

The court found no conflict, in general, between federal
labeling requirements and state failure-to-warn claims based on
the ability of the manufacturer, under the provisions of the
CBE regulation, to add to and strengthen its already approved
This finding was supported by the nearly
warnings. 48
unanimous conclusion by other courts that failure-to-warn
claims are permissible in state courts. 49 Wyeth 's attempt to
draw a comparison to medical devise cases was unsuccessful
since the FDCA's preemption clause only applied to medical
devises and not to prescription drugs. 50 The majority also
rejected the argument that it should follow the conflict
preemption precedent established by U.S. Supreme Court in the
51
case of Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. In that instance
the plaintiffs state tort claim was held to be in direct conflict
with Department of Transportation's specific phase-in plan for
safety devices and its intent to broaden the range of safety
options available to consumers. The key difference between
Geier and drug warning label cases was that "the FDA and the
state share the purpose of encouraging pharmaceutical
companies to alter their drug labels when they are inadequate
to protect consumers." 52

2010/Wyeth v. Levine/ 12

The court then considered whether the specific facts in the
case before it justified a preemption of the state claims based
on an impossibility of compliance claim. Wyeth had asserted
that it could not comply with state law requirements since the
FDA had approved the label in use at the time of Levine's
injury. The court noted that the approval of the Phenergan
warning label should not preclude a jury from finding that the
label was insufficient since the company had the possibility,
under the CBE regulation, to strengthen its warning with
53
It also
respect to the IV-push administration of Phenergan.
rejected Wyeth 's suggestion that when the FDA approved the
label in 1998, with the instruction to "[re]etain the same
verbiage" (rather than with the changes suggested by Wyeth in
1988), it was stating its opinion that the stronger warning was
unnecessary. The problem with Wyeth' s argument was that
the label changes that it proposed in 1988 were no more
adequate than the original label in warning against the IV -push
54
administration of Phenergan.
Wyeth was also unpersuasive in its claim that the Vermont
common-law liability in this case would be an obstacle to the
purposes and objectives of Congress. The court found that
primary goal of the FDCA was to protect consumers from
55
dangerous products and the purposes and objectives of
Congress in the regulating the marketing of prescription drugs
was merely to set the minimum standards under which a
The fact that the 1962
manufacturer must comply. 56
amendments expressly limited the preemptive effect of the
statute unless there is a "direct and positive conflict" between
state and federal law enabled the court to conclude that "where
it is possible to comply with both state law and the FDCA, the
state law is consistent with the purposes and objectives of
Congress."57
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The discussion of the preemption issue concluded with an
analysis of the preemption statement that the FDA had inserted
into the preamble to the 2006 regulation. Although the court
acknowledged that it is ordinarily required to defer to an
agency's interpretation of the statute that it administers, it
58
refused to do so in this case.
Deference is appropriate when
a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue"- it is not appropriate when it contradicts the
"unambiguously express intent of Congress." 59 In this case,
Congress had spoken on the issue. The FDCA provided for the
express preemption of state laws (in drug regulation matters)
only if it was impossible for a manufacturer to comply with
both federal and state requirements. Since the CBE regulation
already allowed a manufacturer to unilaterally add or
strengthen a label warning, the issue of impossibility was not
present.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Reiber argued that
Levine ' s common-law claims were in conflict with federal law
for two reasons. The first was that it would be impossible for
Wyeth to comply with both the state and federal requirements.
The FDA had approved the administration of Phenergan by the
IV method and it had required Wyeth to list the IV
administration on its label. If Wyeth altered the label to
comply with state law it would have to eliminate an FDA
approved use from the label- and that would make it
impossible for the company to comply with the state and
60
The second was that allowing the plaintiffs
federal laws.
state law claims to go forward would present an obstacle to
federal purposes and objectives. While the goal of the FDA is
to ensure that the drugs in the marketplace are safe, it does so
knowing that no drug is without risks. When the FDA
considers whether to approve a NDA, it engages in a riskbenefit analysis with the intention of maximizing the
availability of beneficial treatments. A state court jury, on the
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other hand, "does not engage in a measured and multi-faceted
policy analysis. Rather, a jury views the safety of the drug
through the lens of a single patient who has already been
catastrophically injured."61 The result is that a jury' s verdict
that a drug was unreasonably dangerous can fmstrate the
FDA's wider public health assessment that the drug is safe and
effective.

IV. WYETH V. LEVINE- U.S. SUPREME COURT
DECISION
A. Majority Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, with two
concurrences and one dissent, affirmed the lower court
decisions in favor of the plaintiff. 62 The issue that Wyeth
presented on appeal was "whether prescription drug labeling
judgments imposed on manufacturers by the Food and Drug
Administration ... pursuant to FDA' s comprehensive safety
and efficacy authority under the Federal Food, Dmg, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 30 l et seq. , preempt state-law
product liability claims premised on the theory that different
labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably
safe for use," 63 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority, addressed the somewhat different issue of whether
the FDA's approval of Phencrgan provided Wyeth with a
complete defense to Levine ' s common-law negligence and
strict liability claims--and answered the question in the
negative.64
Before discussing the preemption issue, Stevens highlighted
two important findings of fact that had been decided at the trial
level and identified two legal principles that were essential to
his analysis of the case. The first factual finding was that
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Levine's arm would not have developed gangrene if the
Phenergan label had adequately warned of the risks of
administering the drug by the IV -push method. The fact that
the physician assistant's administered a greater than
recommended dose of the drug (which may have inadvertently
entered an artery rather than a vein) was a foreseeable
intervening force- and the inadequate label was both a but-for
and a proximate cause of Levine's injuries. 65 The second jury
finding was that the lack of an adequate warning about the
risks of an IV-push administration of Phenergan was the
critical defect in its warning label. 66 That the jury found the
warning to be insufficient did not, however, mean that it had
mandated a particular replacement label nor did it require the
67
contraindicating of IV -push administration.
Stevens then summarized the two legal cornerstones of
preemption jurisdiction. The first was the principle that "the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
preemption case." 68 The second was that in those preemption
cases in which Congress has legislated in a field traditionally
occupied by the States, the court "starts with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 69
Wyeth had argued that Levine' s state tort actions were
preempted because of the impossibility of complying with a
state-law duty to modify the drug' s label without violating
federal law and because a state tort action created an
unacceptable "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"70 since it allowed
a jury's decision about a drug label to trump the expert
judgment of the FDA. Stevens found both arguments to be
without merit.
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1. Impossible to Comply
Wyeth 's impossible to comply argument was based on the
premise that, once the FDA has approved a drug warning label,
the manufacturer could not change the wording of the label
until a supplemental application was filed with, and approved
by, the FDA. Wyeth argued that it could not have relied on the
CBE regulation to unilaterally change the warning label for
Phenergin since the CBE regulation had been amended so that
it only applied to cases in which the labels would "reflect
71
newly acquired information." Since Levine presented no new
evidence (which the FDA had not already considered)
concerning the risks of the IV-push administration, Wyeth
claimed that it would have been impossible to change the label
to meet state-law obligations without violating federal law.
argument
as
a
Stevens
dismissed
Wyeth 's
"misapprehens[ion] both of the federal drug regulatory scheme
and its burden in establishing a pre-emption defense." 72 He
found no need to consider the merits of Wyeth's contention
that the 2008 amendment of the CBE regulation was consistent
with the FDC and the regulation in effect at the time of
Levine ' s injection since the "newly acquired information" that
is referred to in the regulation applies to " new analyses of
previously submitted data" and not just to new data.73
According to the amended CBE regulation:
[I]f the sponsor submits adverse event
information to FDA, and then later conducts a
new analysis of data showing risks of a different
type or of greater severity or frequency than did
reports previously submitted to FDA, the
sponsor meets the requirements for newly
. d.In1ormat10n.
c
.
74
acqwre
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The majority opinion acknowledged that the trial record was
"limited concerning what newly acquired information Wyeth
had or should have had about the risks of IV-push
administration of Phenergan." 75 There was, however, evidence
of at least 20 instances in which a Phenergan injection had
resulted in gangrene and amputations. Wyeth had notified the
FDA after the first case came to its attention in 1967- and had
worked with the FDA to change the label. The court suggested
that after it became aware of the additional amputations, Wyeth
could have analyzed the accumulating data and added a
stronger label warning about the IV-push method of
administration.
Stevens presented also two reasons for rejecting Wyeth's
assertion that its unilateral change to the warning label would
have constituted an unauthorized distribution and misbranding
of the drug. The first was that Wyeth was incorrect when it
assumed that a drug would be considered a new drug (without
an effective application) if a change had. been made to its label.
Under the FDCA, the unilateral strengthening of an already
approved warning label would not, in fact, change the drug into
76
a new drug. The second problem was Wyeth's failure to
understand that the mislabeling provision of the FDCA did not
focus on the alteration of an FDA approved label but rather on
the substance of the label-including its failure to include
"adequate warnings."77 Whether a drug has been misbranded
is a matter for a federal jury to ultimately decide. 78 And,
neither Wyeth nor the government, in its amicus curiae brief,
was able to identify even one instance in which the FDA had
initiated an enforcement action against a manufacturer for
strengthening a warning label as provided for under the CBE
regulation.
The Supreme Court credits "Wyeth's cramped reading of
the CBE regulation and its broad reading of the FDCA
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misbranding and unauthorized distribution provisions" 79 to the
company's suggestion that the FDA, and not the manufacturer,
has the primary responsibility for the content of a drug label.
Such a suggestion is in opposition to the central premise of
federal drug regulation. Both the amendments to the FDCA
and FDA regulations designate the manufacturer as the party
responsible for "crafting an adequate label and [for] ensuring
that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the
market." 80
The passage of the FDAAA, in 2007, may have
authorized the FDA, under some circumstance, to order
manufacturers to revise their labels but it also reaffirmed the
manufacturer's obligations-including those specifically
81
referred to in the CBE regulation. Consequently, Wyeth had
an obligation to change its warning label to adequately describe
the risk of gangrene from IV-push injections of Phenerganand was permitted to do so, under the CBE regulation, even
before it received FDA approvai. 82
While it is true that the FDA may ultimately reject unilateral
labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE regulation, there
was no evidence that it would have done so for changes in the
Phenergan label. Wyeth did not allege that it was prohibited by
the FDA from trying to give the kind of warning that the
Vermont jury sought. The Vermont Superior Court found, as a
matter of fact, that there was "no evidence in the record that
either the FDA or the manufacturer gave more than passing
attention to the issue of' the IV -push versus IV-drip
83
administration of Phenergan.
The Vermont Supreme Court
also concluded that there was no record of the FDA's intention
to either preserve the IV -push method or to prohibit the
manufacturer from strengthening the warning with regard to
84
the TV-push method. Finally, Wyeth itself never alleged that
it had supplied the FDA with an evaluation or analysis of the
specific dangers associated with the IV-push method.
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Wyeth's claim
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that it would have been impossible to comply with the state and
federal requirements since there is no evidence that the FDA
would have prevented it from adding a stronger warning to the
Phenergan label.
2. Obstruction of Purposes and Objectives of Regulation of
Congress
Wyeth's second preemption argument was based on the
theory that if it complied with the state-law duty (to provide a
stronger warning on the Phenergan label), it would, in fact,
obstruct the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory
scheme (including the need for FDA officials to use their
expert knowledge to strike a balance between competing
objectives of safety and efficiency). 85 Stevens rejected this
claim on the grounds that it was faulty in its interpretation of
congressional intent and represented an overboard view of the
agency's power to preempt state law.
Congress enacted the Food and Drug Act and the FDCA to
supplement, but not replace, the protections already available
to consumers under state laws. 8 () Neither the acts nor their
subsequent amendments provided any federal remedies to
injured consumers. Stevens suggested two reasons for this
omission. The first was that widely available state remedies
already provided appropriate relief. The second was that the
possibility of costly state remedies promoted consumer
protection by motivating manufacturers to be more vigilant in
producing safe products with adequate warning labels. 87
Another significant matter contributing to the majority's
decision was the fact that Congress had never amended the
FDCA to expressly preempt state law suits involving
prescription drugs. Congress could have drafted a general
preemption clause for the FDCA when it included the specific
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preemption provision in the Medical Devices Amendments in
1976. The fact that it was silent on the issue at a point in time
(when it was certainly aware of the prevalence of state court
litigation) convinced Stevens that Congress "did not intend the
FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug
88
safety and effectiveness. "
Wyeth had suggested that one of the ways that state lawsuits
obstructed the purposes and objections of the federal regulation
of drugs was that they did not take into account the balancing
of risks and benefits that inform the FDA in its decision
making process. The FDA itself had stated in the preamble to
the 2006 regulation that the FDCA established "both a floor
89
and a ceiling" for the regulation of drugs.
It then proceeded
to articulate its conclusion that state laws and state law actions,
including failure-to-warn claims, were an obstacle to
achievement of the full objectives and purposes of the federal
regulatory law since they "threaten FDA's statutorily
prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for
evaluating and regulating drugs."90
Stevens found Wyeth's reliance on the FDA ' s preamble to
the 2006 regulation to be less than convincing. While it is true
91
that a federal regulation may preempt conflicting state laws,
preemption is not guaranteed if the agency acts without
congressional authorization. An agency's mere assertion that
state law has been preempted because it is an obstacle to
statutory objectives cannot survive a judicial determination to
the contrary. One of the problems with the FDA's preamble
statement was that it directly contradicted the FDA's notice of
proposed rulemaking for the 2006 regulation. That notice
specifically stated that the rule "would not contain policies that
92
have federalism implications or preempt State Law. "
Consequently, when the FDA finalized the rule with its new
articulation of the FDCA's preemptive effect in the preamble,
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it did so without giving the states or other interested parties
notice of the proposed change or opportunity to comment it. 93
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B. Concurring Opinions
I. Justice Breyer

The preamble was also suspect since it reversed two of the
FDA's longstanding positions (that the federal labeling
standards were a floor upon which the states could build and
that the FDA would not attempt to preempt failure-to-warn
claims) without providing a reasoned explanation for the
94
change.
Prior to 2006, both Congress and the FDA have
treated state law as a complementary form of drug regulation
and had traditionally relied on state tort suits to "uncover
unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly."95
The court also rejected Wyeth's claim that the alleged
conflict between federal and state law in the present case was
analogous to the one that supported the car manufacturer' s
preemption claim in the Geier v. American Honda Motor,
Co ..96 In that case, the Department of Transportation had
formulated the regulatory scheme (which allowed car
manufacturers to satisfy a safety requirement by choosing from
a range of passive restraint devices) after it had conducted a
formal rulemaking and then adopted a phase-in plan. Unlike
the FDA's nonexistent record to explain the basis for the
changes announced in the 2006 preamble, the Department of
Transportation's contemporaneous record "revealed the factors
the agency had weighed and the balance it had struck."97
For all of the above reasons, Stevens concluded that
preamble of the 2006 regulation did not merit deference, that it
was possible for Wyeth to comply with the state and federal
laws, and that Wyeth's obstruction of purposes and objectives
claims were insufficient to preempt Levine's common law
claims.

The Justice Stephen Breyer's concurring opinion was very
brief. His primary concern was to emphasize that the reason
the majority arrived at its opinion was because there was " no
occasion in this case to consider the preemptive effect of a
specific agency regulation bearing the force of law." 98 As
such, this decision would not preclude the court from deciding
in the future that FDA had sought to determine whether and
when state law acts had become a hindrance to achieving the
congressional goal of safe drug-related medical care and had
embodied those determinations in lawful regulations that had a
preemptive effect.
2. Justice Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion that concurred in
the judgment but did not join the majority's implicit
endorsement of a far-reaching implied preemption doctrine that
"routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts
with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or
generalized notions of congressional
that are
embodied within the text of federal law."9 His approach was
based on his more traditionally conservative view of the
"delicate balance of power mandated by the Constitution."100
The recurring theme in Thomas' concurring opinion was his
conviction that the question of preemption had to turn on
whether state law conflicted with the text of the relevant
federal statute or with the federal regulations authorized by that
text. Since the texts of the statutory and regulatory scheme did
not guarantee that a company was insulated from liability
under state law once it received an FDA-approval for a
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particular drug label, there was no "direct conflict" between the
federal law and state law and a judgment based on the state law
101
could not be preempted.

C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Samuel Alito characterized
the Wyeth case as an illustration of the proposition "that tragic
102
Alito found it incomprehensible that
facts make bad law."
the majority would allow a state tort jury, rather than the FDA,
to have the ultimate responsibility for regulating the warning
labels for prescription dmgs. Such a result was possible only
because the Court had ignored its own precedent in the case of
103
Geier and had disregarded the general principles of conflict
preemption.
The minority was convinced that the proper framing of the
issue in this case should have been "whether a state tort jury
can countermand the FDA's considered judgment that
Phenergan's FDA-mandated warning renders its intravenous
104
(IV) use "safe."
Alito emphasized the importance of a
drug's warning label. Not only is it "the standard under which
the FDA determines whether a product is safe and effective," 105
it is also the "centerpiece of risk management" . . . "as it
communicates to health care practitioners the agency's formal,
authoritative conclusions regarding the conditions under which
106
When the
the product can be used safely and effectively."
FDA follows its statutory mandate and determines that a drug
is on the balance "safe," its judgment should not be
countermanded by a conflicting determination under state
common-law. The conflict itself is the basis for federal
preemption- even in those instances where Congress has not
. 107
enacted an express preemptiOn.
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Alito then went on to demonstrate how the court, in Geier,
was able to apply the conflict preemption doctrine to a situation
108
where the regulatory statute contained a savings clause.
A
key factor in that case was the view of the Secretary that the
Department of Transportation's decision to allow the auto
makers to choose from a number of safety options was the best
way to promote safety. "Because the Secretary determined that
the menu of alternative technologies was "safe," the doctrine of
conflict preemption barred [the plaintiffs] efforts to deem
some of those federally approved alternatives "unsafe" under
state tort law." 109 The minority thought the court should have
applied its rationale in Geier to the present case--in which the
FDA had deemed the methods of alternative administration
provided in the menu on the Phenergan label to be "safe" and
"effective. "
The remainder of the dissenting opinion was devoted to a
discussion of the three categories of reasons why the majority
of the court failed follow its own precedent in Geier. The first
was factual. The minority suggested that the court had
willfully disregarded the fact that the FDA had considered (and
stmck a balance between) the costs and benefits attached to the
IV push method. 110 The second was legal. The court had
denied the existence of a federal-state conflict in this case; 111 it
dismissed the FDA 's articulation of its preemptive intent in the
preamble to the 2006 regulation on the grounds that the
interested Rarties were not afforded notice or an opportunity for
comment; 12 it determined that the FDA's preamble, unlike the
Department of Transportation's regulation, did not "bear the
force of law;" 113 it "sandwiched" its discussion of Geier
between its discussion of the "presumption against
preemption" and its lengthy consideration of the traditional
coexistence of state and federal law in the area of dmg
regulation; 11 4 and it appeared to completely disregard the
FDA's explanation, in its amicus brief, with regard to the
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conflict between state tort cases and the federal labeling
regime. 115 And, the third reason was judgmental. The court
had decided to recklessly allow ill-equipped juries to perform
the FDA's cost-benefit balancing functions. 116
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine was
certainly disappointing to many in the business community.
This was particularly true for companies producing
commodities that are regulated by the federal government. If
the court had preempted the state product liability actions
against drug companies, there was hope that it would
eventually extend that same preemption protection to product
liability cases involving manufacturers of products as diverse
117
as antifreeze, fireworks, popcorn, cigarettes, and light bulbs.
It would also have allowed companies to concentrate on
complying with only one set of regulatory laws.
In recent years, business has found many sympathetic allies
in Washington, D.C. The Bush administration "encouraged
federal agencies to issue rules preempting state laws and
declared that a single federal standard held sway." 11 8 The court
used theories of express and implied preemption to limit the
ability of injured parties to sue manufacturers in state court.
There has, however, been some shifting of sympathies under
the Obama administration.
On January 20, 2009, a
memorandum was sent to federal agency heads instructing
them to stay pending or recently completed rules. On March 4,
2009, the Supreme Court rejected the preemption arguments of
Wyeth (and the Bush administration ' s amicus brief in support
of Wyeth).
A week later, the Office of Budget and
Management issued a statement that it had taken note of the
principles in Wyeth and intended to provide adequate notice
and comment periods for federal regulations and to instruct
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federal agencies to preempt state tort laws only when Congress
intends it to do so. 119 Finally, on May 20, 2009, President
Obama issued a revised Executive Order 13132 instructing
federal agency heads to roll-back the prior administration's
attempts to issue regulations that were designed to protect
compames from state court lawsuits and that were not
justified. 120
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